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NOTES
JAIL, JAIL, THE GANG'S ALL HERE:
SENATE CRIME BILL SECTION 521, THE
CRIMINAL STREET GANG PROVISION
Urban street gangs continue to plague major cities.' Although they
are not new to this country, over the past two decades the general
public has increasingly viewed gangs as a significant threat to the
peace.2 Officials in California estimate that from 1980 to 1989, the
number of gang members in Los Angeles County increased from
30,000 to 70,000, and the number of gang-related murders doubled
from 279 to 570 per year." Gangs are also said to have expanded
geographically, spreading from large cities into smaller cities and sub-
urbs. 4 Some commentators suggest the reported increases are a result
of changes in record-keeping, and others note that not every area has
reported increased activity.5 Virtually every state in the country, how-
ever, now experiences some level of gang violence in its largest cities."
Police have employed a variety of methods to combat gangs, but have
struggled in attempting to quell the problem.'
In reaction, Congress has expressed predictable concern. Assess-
ing the impact of street gang violence, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter
(R-Pa.) said in 1990:
Not since the 1920's has such widespread violence plagued
our city streets. This lawlessness revolves around the illegal
1137 CoNG, REe. 58333 (daily ed. June 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Specter); N. Denise
Burke, Restricting Gang Clothing in the Public Schools, Apr. 1993, available in WESTLAW, 80 WELR
513, at * 1.
2 Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 739,
740-41 (1990).
3 Id.
4 Burke, supra note I, at *1; Tom Zucco, Men Gangs—A Growing Problem in Tampa Bay, Sr.
PETERSBURG TUrf ES, July 14,1993, at ID.
5 Burrell, supra note 2, at 741 n.8.
6 M. at 740; Burke, supra note 1, at *1.
7 Burrell, supra note 2, at 741-45.
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drug trade, and increasingly involves our nation's young peo-
ple . . . . [U]nless we take immediate and vigorous action, we
run the risk of fostering a permanent underclass living out-
side the common values of our society. 8
In 1994 Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Bill, later signed into
law by President Clinton. Among the provisions is 18 U.S.CA. § 521.'
Section 521 lengthens the sentences of any street gang member who
g 137 CONG. REC. 58333 (daily ed. June 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Specter).
9 18 U.S.C.A § 521 (West Supp. 1995) provides:
(a) Definitions.—
"conviction" includes a finding, under State or Federal law, that a person has
committed an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent or controlled sub
stances felony.
"criminal street gang" means an ongoing group, club, organization, or association
of 5 or more persons—
(A) that has as I of its primary purposes the commission of 1 or more of the
criminal offenses described in subsection (c);
(B) the members of which engage, or have engaged within the past 5 years, in a
continuing series of offenses described in subsection (c); and
(C) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.
(b) Penalty.—The sentence of a person convicted of an offense described in sub-
section (c) shall be increased by up to 10 years if the offense is committed under
the circumstances described in subsection (d).
(c) Offenses.—The offenses described in this section are—
(1) a Federal felony involving a controlled substance (as defined in section 102
of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)) for which the maximum penalty
is not less than 5 years;
(2) a Federal felony crime of violence that has as an element the use or attempted
use of physical force against the person of another; and
(3) a conspiracy to commit an offense described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(d) Circumstances.—The circumstances described in this section are that the of-
fense described in subsection (c) was committed by a person who—
(1) participates in a criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage
in or have engaged in a continuing series of offenses described in subsection (c);
(2) intends to promote or further the felonious activities of the criminal street
gang or maintain or increase his or her position in the gang; and
(3) has been convicted within the past 5 years for
(A) an offense described in subsection (c);
(13) a State offense-
(i) involving a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Control-
led Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)) for which the maximum penalty is not less than
5 years' imprisonment; or
(ii) that is a felony crime of violence that has as an element the use or
attempted use of physical force against the person of another;
(C) any Federal or State felony offense that by its nature involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense; or
(D) a conspiracy to commit an offense described in subparagraph (A), (B), or
(C).
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is both convicted of committing certain enumerated felonies and
who has a prior conviction for one of the enumerated crimes in the
preceding five years.'"
In order to enhance a felon's sentence, the Government must
demonstrate two key facts." First, the Government must. establish that
the individual participated in the gang with the knowledge that its
members engage in felonious activity.'" Second, the Government must
show that one of the primary purposes of the gang is to commit
felonious crimes.v3 These two requirements were added in conference
committee to the bill, S. 1607, § 603 ("section 603"), that was originally
passed by the Senate.m Section 603 in essence required only that the
individual have been convicted of certain felonies in the past five years
and that he commit the prosecuted crime "as a member" of a criminal
street gang.'" The narrowing of section 603 came on the heels of
criticism that this original section, by casting too wide a net, penalized
benign association.'"
Section 521, the current section, very likely survives constitutional
scrutiny. The only association that it criminalizes is association with the
specific intent to engage in further criminal activity." California courts
have upheld a very similar state statute.'" Section 603, however, would
have been a stronger club in the hands of federal prosecutors because
it contained fewer required elements.'`' Congress, though, opted for a
narrower provision, perhaps concerned about the viability of its ap-
proach in light of constitutional protection of freedom of association.'"
The United States Supreme Court has recognized two distinct
forms of freedom of association: expressive and intimate. 2 ' The Su-
ID Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
131d.
" S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1993).
15 Id.
16 Paul Craig Roberts, So You Say You're Not a Gang Member? Read on, Bus. Wit., Feb. 21,
1994, at 22 (describing similar congressional proposal).
17 18 U.S.C.A. § 521(d) (2).
im In re Alberto R., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); People V. CatTICZ, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 894, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
19 See S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1993).
20 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 521.
1 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984). For a discussion of Roberts and
the freedoms of intimate and expressive association, see Lois M. McKenna, Freedom of Association
or Gender Discrimination? New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 38 Am. U. L. REV.
1061 (1989); Mary Patricia Trentham Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26 Gotvz.
L. REv. 91 (1990/91).
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preme Court read freedom of expressive association into the First
Amendment to enable citizens to exercise effectively their right to free
speech. 22 The Court considers expressive association a penumbral right
under the broad protection of speech, rather than an absolute right."
Thus, when an individual joins an organization engaged in illegal
activity, his association with that organization receives partial First
Amendment protection. 24 Membership in that organization could be
grounds for criminal liability, but only if the individual intends to
further the organization's illegal goals. 25
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized what it now
labels as freedom of intimate association either in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a penumbral right under
the Bill of Rights. 2e The Court has generally limited this right to the
context of family relations, striking clown legislation that unduly inter-
feres with those relations. 27 For example, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a statute requiring children to attend public schools,28 an ordi-
nance preventing grandparents from living with their families in certain
residential housing, 29 and a statute requiring individuals owing child
support to seek the approval of the state before remarrying. 3°
In 1983, the Supreme Court suggested that the freedom of inti-
mate association may extend to non-familial organizations. 31 Since then,
however, the Court has considered but declined to provide this protec-
tion to a number of private organizations.'2 The Court has found the
organizations it has analyzed too impersonal to receive protection as
intimate family organizations."
This Note offers a framework for analyzing the constitutionality
of section 603. Part I briefly examines the dynamics of street gangs and
22 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 182-83 (1965) (summarizing the Court's develop-
ment of the freedom of association as a peripheral right under the First Amendment earlier in
the century).
23 Id. The right. is penumbral in that it exists to facilitate protection of another constitutional
right as opposed to being an independently protected right under the Constitution. Id.
24 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 (1970).
25 1d. at 186.
28 See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (collecting cases); Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 482-83.
27 See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 499; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(holding families have right to educate their children privately).
28 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
" Moore, 431 U.S. at 506.
38 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 379, 388 (1978).
31
 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
32 See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988); Board of
Directors of Rotary It'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987).
33 See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 12; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546.
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the reasons why individuals join them." Part II explains how section
603 attempted to curb gang violence, and distinguishes section 603
from the current section 521." Part III outlines the development of
the freedoms of intimate and expressive association."
In Part IV, this Note argues that section 603's implied criminal
intent requirement likely rendered it constitutional under traditional
freedom of expressive association analysis. 97 Given the close, family-like
relationships within street gangs, section 603 would also have merited
scrutiny under the freedom of intimate association." This Note argues
that the Supreme Court would have upheld section 603 under this line
of cases as well."
The viability of section 603 is of more than academic interest. The
strong likelihood that section 603 ultimately would have survived scrutiny
calls into question the merits of the additional requirements in section
521, the current law. This Note concludes that although section 521's
express intent requirement was a sensible addition, its primary purpose
requirement places an unnecessary burden upon the prosecution. 4°
1. Ti-n: ATTRACTION OF STREET GANGS
Experts on street gangs argue that gangs attract youth primarily
for social reasons.4 I These experts discount the desire for protection
as a motive for joining gangs. 42 Although some gang members come
from strong families, for many the gang serves as a surrogate family.'"
Street gangs often satisfy "the need for belonging" and provide desper-
ately-sought status for young men and boys." Police who work with
gangs support this assessment. 45 They note that the search for identity
can be seen in the numerous identifying features of gangs: their clothes,
34 See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 62-193 and accompanying text..
37 See infra notes 194-21 1 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 212-41 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 212-41 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 242-46 arid accompanying text.
41 Zucco, supra note 4, at 1 D.
42 Id. (quoting George Knox, professor and director of the Gang Crime Research Center at
Chicago State University).
131d.
44
48 V. Dion Hayes and Joseph Kirby, Family Ties Often Are No Match for the Bonds of a Gang,
CH1. TRM., Mar. 30,1992, at I. "You can't ignore the fact that kids need to belong to something
or someone. They are looking for a link with something.... In many ways, street gangs emphasize
the same values as any other youth group—fidelity, friendship and discipline. And gangs fulfill a
teenager's innate desire for acceptance ... ." Id. (quoting a police officer).
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their colors, and their hand signals.4° Finally, the California Attorney
General's Youth Gang Task Force confirms that for a majority of gang
members, the gang functions as an extension of the family and pro-
vides companionship that would otherwise be missing. 47
Significantly, gangs possess many of the dynamics that the Su-
preme Court has suggested would allow a private organization to claim
protection under the freedom of intimate association." Street gangs
are often very difficult to join." Many gangs require their members to
participate in certain rituals, albeit rituals that often require the indi-
vidual to withstand considerable pain. 5° For example, some gangs re-
quire a potential member to remain standing for a period of time as
gang members strike the individual. 5 ' An important. part of being a
gang member also involves emphasizing the gang's separateness through
reinforcing the coherence of the organization. 52 Although street gangs
often achieve this goal through intimidating non-members, pride in
being a member arguably motivates such activity more than a desire
to threaten others."
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Section 603 would have sought, and section 521 seeks, to punish
gang membership by adding ten years to the sentence of any gang
member convicted of another crime.54 Under both sections, the addi-
tional penalty only applies to individuals acting as gang members when
committing the other crime." Section 603 defined "criminal street
gang" as any group, club, organization, or association of five or more
people who, within the past five years, engaged in a continuing series
of offenses including federal felonies involving violence or controlled
substances, or any state offense involving controlled substances or
violence punishable by more than one year in prison. 56 Under the
provision, an individual could have been sentenced to an additional
ten years if he: (1) committed or conspired to commit a federal felony
involving controlled substances or violence; (2) was a member of or
46 Id.
47 Burrell, supra note 2, at 750-51.
°Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
49 See Burke, supra note 1, at *6.
96 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
54 18 U.S.C.A. § 521; S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1993).
99 18 U.S.C.A. § 521; S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1993).
66 S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1993).
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acted on behalf of a criminal street gang; and (3) had been convicted
within the past five years under either a federal or state statute involv-
ing drugs or violence or a federal statute involving theft or destruction
of property.57
Section 521 incorporates the above elements and adds two addi-
tional requirements. 58 First, it limits the definition of criminal street
gangs to gangs that have as one of their "primary purposes" commit-
ting, or conspiring to commit, federal felonies involving violence or
controlled substances.56 Second, it adds an individual intent require-
ment. 6° For the section to apply, the individual must participate in the
gang with the knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged
in a continuing series of the offenses described above."'
III. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Freedom of association is a penumbral right under the First Amend-
ment and an independent substantive right found either in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a penumbral right
under the Bill of Rights.° It protects two independent types of associa-
tion.65 First, the First Amendment protects expressive association; be-
cause group association strengthens advocacy of beliefs, the freedom
of association to advance beliefs is inseparable from freedom of speech. 64
The right to expressive association protects the acts of associating that
advance beliefs pertaining to political, economic, religious, or cultural
matters. 65
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights protect
intimate association . 66 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized
that this freedom of intimate association protects relationships funda-
mental to family life.67 The Court applies strict scrutiny to state regu-
lations interfering with family relationships, requiring such regulations
to be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial state interest.° Thus far,
the Court has limited the freedom of intimate association to the crea-
57 S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1993).
58 18 U.S.CA. § 521.
" 18 U.S.C.A. § 521 (a) (A).
"18 U.S.C.A. § 521(d) (1).
61 Id.
62 Griswold v. Stale of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83, 486 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama ex
ref Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
°Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
84 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 480.
66 Id.
66 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19.
67 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
68 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386, 388 (1978).
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don and sustenance of the family, although recently the Court consid-
ered extending it to non-familial organizations, most notably service
organizations!'"
A. Freedom of Intimate Association
In the 1920s, the United States Supreme Court pronounced that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects certain basic familial rights." For
example, in 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court recognized in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the right of
families to privately educate their children. 71 The Court invalidated a
statute that required children to attend public schools, reasoning that
parents have a liberty right to nurture their children as they choose. 72
The Court concluded that the state had no legitimate interest in
standardized education of children."
In 1965, in Griswold v. State of Connecticut, the Supreme Court
cited Pierce in finding a right to privacy implied by the penumbras of
the first ten amendments. 74 The Court ruled that laws prohibiting the
use of contraceptives violated married couples' right to privacy." The
Court reasoned that the law had a "destructive impact" upon married
couples that was too sweeping to survive constitutional scrutiny."
Then, in a series of cases in the 1970s, the Supreme Court again
explored the limits of family-based rights. 77 The first such case, al-
though specifically grounded in the First Amendment freedom of
religion, approvingly referred to Pierce. 78 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
Court read Pierce as establishing a charter for parental rights in raising
their children," and, in so doing, invalidated the conviction of Amish
parents who refused to send their children to school after the eighth
grade. 8° Noting that the Amish parents had presented sufficient evi-
dence that vocational education at home was in their children's best
interest, the Court concluded that the state statute was not sufficiently
69
 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-20.
70 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-40 (1923).
71 268 U.S. at 534-35.
72 Id.
75 See id.
74 381 U.S. 481, 482-84 (1965).
76 Id. at 485-86,
76 Id. at 485.
77 See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 234 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 (1972).
78
 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 207, 234.
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narrowly tailored to overcome the family's First Amendment freedom
of religion rights."
This period witnessed more than an affirmation of Pierce. In two
other cases, the Supreme Court extended what was later to be called
freedom of intimate association beyond the traditional, nuclear fam-
ily. 82 In 1972, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court extended family-
based protection to parents of illegitimate children." The Court struck
down a statute that, upon the death of a child's mother, automatically
declared the child a ward of the state if the father was not married to
the mother. 84 The Court reasoned that the due process rights of the
father mandated at least an individual evaluation of his fitness to raise
his children." Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the admin-
istrative convenience of a presumptive determination did not consti-
tute a state interest sufficient to justify the infringement of the father's
due process rights."
Then, in 1977, in Moore v. East Cleveland, the Supreme Court
extended the freedom of intimate association to relatives more distant
than biological parents." Reasoning that the protection of the family
is rooted in a desire to protect the ability of one generation to pass on
"our most cherished values, moral and cultural" to the next generation,
the Court, in a plurality opinion, concluded that grandparents, uncles,
aunts, and cousins are important to that process of inculcation." The
Court thus struck down an ordinance that limited occupancy of dwell-
ing units to members of the immediate family." In so doing, the Court
concluded that the ordinance's distinction between types of family
members was arbitrary and purposeless and violated the due process
rights of extended family members."
That same year, the Court also signalled its willingness to extend
the freedom of intimate association beyond blood relationships. 9 ' In
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, the Court considered proce-
dures that gave the State of New York the complete authority to remove
°' Id. at 234.
87 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S, 494, 499 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653
(1972).
83
 405 U.S. at 646, 652, 658.
84 Id. at 658.
85 Id.
116 See id. at 652, 657-58.
B7 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
8.8 Id. at 495, 503-05.
69 Id. at 506.
98 See id. at 500.
91 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977) (dictum).
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children from foster homes in order to return them to their natural
parents.92 Like in Moore, the Court reasoned that the importance of
the familial relationship derives from intimate daily association and
From promotion of a way of life, as well as from a blood relationship. 93
Smith found the first two factors equally prevalent in a relationship with
adoptive parents as in a relationship with natural parents." The Court
ruled, however, that the procedure at issue did not violate the foster
parents' due process rights, largely because the children were removed
so that they could be returned to their natural parents. 95 Thus, al-
though the Court did not precisely identify the level of protection
afforded to adoptive and foster parents, it clearly indicated that those
relationships should receive some level of constitutional protection. 96
Finally, in 1978, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a Wisconsin statute requiring individuals who owed child sup-
port to obtain state approval before remarrying. 97 The Court ruled that
because marriage is a fundamental right, the Wisconsin statute had to
be narrowly tailored to the State's interest of encouraging child sup-
port payments. 98 The Court struck down the statute because it was not
narrowly tailored. 99 The Court reasoned that preventing single fathers
from getting married before seeking state approval was an under-in-
clusive means of assuring child support because the statute did not
prevent other financial commitments. 1 °6 The Court also concluded that
the statute was over-inclusive in that it prevented fathers from improv-
ing their financial condition by marrying a woman who could bring
another income to the family.'°'
Thus, entering the 1980s, the Supreme Court had extended the
family-based rights to many variations of the traditional family struc-
ture, including relations between spouses and relations between chil-
dren and their natural or foster parents.'" In 1983, in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, the Supreme Court expressly brought this line of cases
under the general rubric of freedom of association.' 03 At the same time,
92 1d. at 849, 855-56.
93 Id. at 844.
99 Id .
95 Id. at 848-49.
"See Smith, 431 U.S. at 844-46.
97 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
98 Id. at 390.
99 Id.
1" Id. at 389-90.
101 Id. at 390.
102
 See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 390; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
103 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
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the Court signalled its willingness to extend the right to non-familial
associations."m In Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the freedom of
intimate association did not exempt United States Jaycees from a state
prohibition of discrimination against women.'° 5 The Jaycees contended
that the statute was unconstitutional because the freedom of associa-
tion afforded them the right to exclude women and associate only with
men.'" The Court concluded, however, that the freedom of intimate
association is limited to more intimate relationships than those present
in large service clubs such as the Jaycees. 107
in examining the Jaycees' claim, the Court laid out a framework
for analyzing the freedom of intimate association.'" The Court noted
that all the previously protected forms of intimate association involved
family relationships: marriage, raising and educating children, and
cohabitation with relatives.m The Court indicated that the right was
not limited to family settings, but stated that any protected non-family
relationship would have to be relatively small, highly selective at the
inception of the association and throughout its duration, and exclusive
of others in fundamental areas of the relationship."'" The Court did
not draw a clear line separating the intimate relationships that are
protected from the less personal ones that are not."' The Court simply
noted that the Jaycees were clearly too impersonal."'
In four subsequent cases, the Court, although not always consis-
tent in describing the source of the freedom, declined to further
extend freedom of intimate association to non-familial organizations." 3
Three years after Roberts, in Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, the Court held that Rotary Clubs are not im-
mune from sexual discrimination laws. 14 The Rotary Court suggested
that the freedom of intimate association emanates from an "element
of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights," rather than the Fourteenth
101
105 Id. at 628-29.
106 See id. at 628.
157 at 620-21.
108 Roberts, 468 U,S. at 619-2{}.
1 °9 M. at 619.
"° Id. at 620.
in hi.
1 ' 2 1d. at 620-21.
113 See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, '237 (1990); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490
U.S. 19, 24 (1989); New York State Club Association v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1, 4, 12 (1988);
Board of Directors of Rotary Intl v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987),
114 481 U.S. at 546.
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Amendment. 113 In the same paragraph the Court suggested that these
family-based rights are protected by the First Amendment." 6
The Court then applied the factors outlined in Roberts and rea-
soned that Rotary Clubs are too unselective to merit protection." 7 The
Court emphasized that although the size of the various clubs ranged
from fewer than twenty to more than 900 members, all of the clubs
were encouraged to continually recruit new members and maintain an
inclusive atmosphere." 8 The Court also noted that the clubs conducted
many of their activities in the presence of strangers including, for
example, reporters."' The Court concluded that those attributes were
inconsistent with the kind of personal relationships traditionally pro-
tected by the freedom of intimate association.' 2"
Also in 1987, in New York State Club Association v. New York City,
the Court again upheld a state statute prohibiting discrimination of
any kind by private associations.' 2 ' The Association, representing nu-
merous organizations in the state, argued that the statute was facially
invalid.' 22 Noting that some of those organizations had as many as four
hundred members, the Court reasoned that, at a minimum, those
larger clubs were, like the Jaycees and Rotary Clubs, too large to qualify
for the protection afforded to families.' 23 The Court also noted that
the organizations in the Association tended to be commercial in na-
ture, providing the opportunity for members and non-members to
conduct business. 124 Based on these two factors, the Court concluded
that at least some of the organizations covered by the statute would
not be protected by the right of intimate association and thus held the
statute facially valid.' 23
Recently, the Court has twice declined to extend the right of
association beyond traditional notions of family life.' 26 In 1989, in City
of Dallas v. Stanglin, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance that
restricted admittance to certain dance halls to those between the ages
" 5 Id. at 545.
116 Id.
Id. at 546-47.
"8 Id. at 547.
119 Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547.
120 Id . at 546-47.
121 487 U.S. 1, 4, 12 (1988).
122 Id. at 11,
123 /d. at 12,
'24 Id.
1251d.
126 See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490
U.S. 19, 24 (1989).
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of fourteen and eighteen.'" Consistent with the Roberts line of cases,
although analyzed as a First Amendment expressive claim, the Court
noted that admission was not at all selective and that most attendees
were strangers. 128 Rejecting the analysis of the Texas Court of Appeals,
the Court emphasized that there is no generalized right of social
association that encompasses "chance encounters."'" The Court con-
cluded that opportunities for adults and minors to dance with one
another does not involve the kind of association, either intimate or
expressive, "protected by the First Amendment."'" In concurrence,
Justice Stevens maintained that the enjoyment of the company of
friends implicates substantive due process rights and not First Amend-
ment freedom of association rights.' 8 ' But he agreed with the majority
that the statute was constitutional because the State, which argued the
ordinance protected teenagers from crime, drugs, and alcohol, justified
the "modest" burden on teenagers' liberty rights. 192
Similarly, in 1990, in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, the Supreme
Court upheld a city provision that deemed motels which rented rooms
for fewer than ten hours to be sexually-oriented businesses and thus
subject to regulation by the city.' 33 Motel owners argued that the regu-
lation infringed upon the associational rights of their patrons.'" The
owners contended that their patrons had exactly the kind of highly
personal relationships that the freedom of intimate association pro-
tects.'" The Court was not persuaded, concluding that the "personal
bonds" that can be formed in fewer than ten hours in a motel room
are not the kind of bonds that the Roberts Court described as having
"played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs."'"
Thus, although the Supreme Court in Roberts opened the door for
an extension of intimate association to private organizations, Stanglin
and FW/PBS demonstrate the Court is not anxious to step through that
door.'" The Court requires organizations seeking protection to be
127 490 U.S. at 24.
128 Id. at 24-25.
129 Id. at 25.
1311 /d. The Court also upheld the statute under an minimum rationality, equal protection
analysis. Id. at 26-28.
131 Id. at 28-29.
132 Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 28.
133 493 U.S. 215,237 (1990).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 1d.
137 See, e.g., id.; Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24.
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small and selective.m No organization thus far has been able to meet
that test. 139 When the government has criminalized membership in an
organization, those groups that have successfully sought protection
have turned to the right to expressive association.'"
B. Penalizing Membership and Expressive Freedom of Association
The question as to whether the government can make member-
ship in an association illegal first arose in the context of Communist
Party membership."' Shortly after the revolution in Russia, the Com-
munist Party began to make inroads in the United States. 142 By 1919,
an estimated 40,000 Americans had joined the Communist Party."'
The nation widely perceived this to be a threat, and federal and state
governments quickly passed legislation prohibiting advocacy and or-
ganization toward the violent overthrow of the government.'" Initially,
the Supreme Court gave great deference to legislative determinations
that the Communist Party posed a threat to the nation)" But sub-
sequently, the Court required the government to prove an individual's
awareness of the organization's illegal purposes, and his intent to
further those illegal aims, before penalizing his membership. 146
Initially, in 1927, in Whitney v. California, the Supreme Court
upheld the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. 197 The Act outlawed
"syndicalism," defined as associating for the purposes of accomplishing
any desired end by illegal means.'" Many states enacted similar statutes
in response to the perceived growing threat of Communism.'" The
Court reasoned that the statute reflected the legislature's decision that
the offense constituted a significant danger to the public peace and
security of the state.' 5° Noting that such legislative determinations merited
great deference, the Court concluded that the Act was not an unrea-
sonable or arbitrary exercise of the State's police powers and thus was
'38 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987).
159 See, e.g., id.
1 " See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
' 41 See, e.g., id.
142 Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in
the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991).
143 Id.
144 See id. at 4.
' 45 Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
146 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
147 274 U.S. at 372,
146 Id. at 371-72.
149 Rohr, supra note 142, at 4.
150
 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371.
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a valid infringement on any First Amendment rights of speech or
association. 151
Concerns about the spread of communism continued into the late
1940s. 152 In 1950, in Dennis v. United States, the Court confronted the
constitutionality of the Smith Act.'" The Smith Act prohibited advo-
cating the overthrow of the Federal Government by violence or de-
struction, or organizing any group working to overthrow the govern-
ment by violence or destruction.'m In tracing the still-recent development
of First Amendment law, the Court concluded that restriction of First
Amendment rights requires a showing of clear and present danger that
a crime will occur.' 55 The Court held, however, that the clear and
present danger test does not require the government to wait until the
anticipated harm has occurred. 156 Rather, the Court held that the very
act of conspiring to overthrow the government during a period of
international unrest created enough danger to allow the government
to justify the infringement on First Amendment rights.' 57 Relying on
the general threat of communism, the Court upheld the defendants'
convictions under the Smith Act. 158
Subsequent to Dennis, the Court developed a succinct test for
addressing the penalization of membership in a particular associa-
tion. 159 In 1960, in Nato v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned
a conviction under the Smith Act.' 6° The Court held that evidence of
the Communist Party's illegal activities alone was not sufficient to
criminalize the defendant's membership in the party.'"' The Court
stressed the need for the government to establish an individual's intent
to commit illegal acts.' 62
However, in a companion decision to Nolo, Scales v. United States,
the Court upheld the Smith Act against a facial challenge." Although
reasoning that a blanket prohibition of associating with organizations
151 Id. at 571-72.
1"Rohr, supra note 142, at 18.
1" 341 U.S. 494, 495-96 (1951).
"4 /d. at 496.
155 Id. at 505.
156 Id. at 510.
187 1d, at 510-11.
1311 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511.
159 See Healy v, James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, '298
(1961).
16°367 U.S. at 300.
161 Id. at 291.
162 1d. at 299.
1113 367 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1961),
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with both legal and illegal intentions would risk impairing legitimate
association or expression,'" the Scales Court held that the Smith Act
only reached active members who had the intent of advancing the
organization's unlawful concerns. 165 The Court thus constructively read
the requirement of individualized intent into the statute.'""
Subsequent to Scales, the Supreme Court continued to require the
government to demonstrate individualized intent.' 67 In 1966, in Elf-
brandt v. Russell, the Court invalidated an Arizona statute that required
teachers to disavow membership in any organization advocating violent
overthrow.' 68 The Court again emphasized that membership itself in
an organization that engages in unlawful activities poses no threat to
society.'"`' The Court reasoned that laws punishing membership with-
out an individualized showing of illegal intentions effectively presume
individual intent and thereby infringe upon the freedom of associa-
tion."° The Court struck down the Arizona statute because it punished
membership in any organization advocating the violent overthrow of
the government, regardless of whether the individual defendant had
the requisite criminal intent."'
Similarly, in 1970, in Healy v. James, the Court held that without
establishing that certain students intended to violate campus rules and
regulations, Central Connecticut State College's refusal to recognize
their organization violated the First Arnendment. 12 The students had
sought to establish a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society,
a national association of college students known for interrupting classes
and for more violent protest techniques.'" The Court emphasized the
absence of any indication that the students contemplated violent ac-
tion and thus the State failed to demonstrate individualized intent to
further the association's illegal goals.' 74
In 1982, in NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Healy in holding that membership in a local chapter of the
NAACP is not a sufficient basis for imposing civil liability for the
organization's actions.'" Private merchants sued members of the NAACP,
164 Id. at 229.
165 1d.
166 See id.
167 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 193 (1972); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16 (1966).
« 384 U.S. at 16.
169 1d. at 17.
17° Id. at 17-19.
171 Id. at 19.
172 408 U.S. 169, 193-94 (1972).
173 See id. at 170, 172.
174 Id.
175 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982).
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which had organized the boycott of local stores. 17" The Court reaffir-
med the analysis in Healy and applied it to the civil context: mere
membership, without some showing of criminal intent, does not pro-
vide the basis for criminal or civil liability.'" Without that showing, the
government cannot impose a duty to disassociate from an organiza-
tion. 178
As discussed above, when assessing whether a statute is facially
invalid for failure to expressly require individualized intent, the Court
is generally willing to read that requirement into the statute.' 78 In
Scales, the Court held that the membership clause in the Smith Act
effectively required active membership and intent to further illegal
aims. 18° But in United States v. Robel, the Court declined to read a
criminal intent requirement into a statute that contained no restriction
on either the quality or degree of membership in communist parties
that the statute criminalized.' 8 ' Thus, a statute that indiscriminately
penalizes membership in an association without regard to the quality
and degree of membership will be found facially invalid. 182
Finally, in 1992, in Dawson v. Delaware, the Supreme Court for the
first time addressed the freedom of expressive association in the con-
text of a gang, specifically a white, racist, prison gang.' 83 In Dawson, the
Court held that the admission of evidence of the defendant's gang
membership constituted reversible error.'"' The defendant was con-
victed of murdering a woman in her home after escaping from a
Delaware correctional facility. 185 During sentencing, the prosecution
and defense stipulated that Dawson was a member of the Aryan Broth-
erhood.' 8  The defense agreed to the stipulation to avoid testimony on
the subject, but maintained that even the stipulation violated Dawson's
First Amendment rights. 187
The Supreme Court reversed Dawson's conviction on the grounds
that the introductiOn of evidence of his associational beliefs had no
bearing on the issue before the jury.' 88 Critical to the decision was the
' 76 1d. at 889.
177 Id. at 932.
' 78 1d. at 925 n.69.
179 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961).
18°,1d. at 205, 229-30.
181 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967).
182 See id. at 262.
183 112  S. Ct. 1093, 1099 (1992).
181 Id.
183 Id. at 1095.
186 Id. at 1096.
187 1d.
188 Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1099.
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finding that the defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
was protected by the First Amendment.' 89 The Court based that finding
on the freedom of expressive association as opposed to the freedom
of intimate association developed in the Roberts line of cases.'"
In sum, under the Healy freedom of expressive association cases,
statutes cannot penalize mere membership in an organization with
illegal activity.'9 ' Convictions under such statutes will survive only so
long as the member was aware of the organization's illegal activity and
intended to further that activity.' 92 The intent requirement need not
be express, but the Court has not been willing to read it into statutes
lacking any restriction on either the degree or quality of criminalized
membership.' 93
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 603
Because section 603 should be read to require a street gang mem-
ber to have individualized intent to further the gang's criminal inter-
ests, the section would likely survive the Healy test for freedom of
expressive association.'94 Similarly, although street gangs may present
a compelling case for protection under the Court's freedom of inti-
mate association test as currently structured, section 603 would likely
survive the Roberts test as well.' 99 Thus, justification for the narrowing
of section 603 into the current section 521 must rest more in policy
considerations than in constitutional jurisprudence.
A. The Healy Test
Under the right to expressive association, Dawson signifies that
associations as distasteful as Aryan prison gangs are entitled to protec-
tion of the freedom of expressive association under the First Amend-
ment.'" In applying First Amendment standard analysis to section 603,
the Court would look to the Healy test because the section punished
membership in groups engaged in illegal activities.'•" Under the Healy
' 89 Id. at 1096-97.
190 See id.
191 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 193-94 (1972).
192 sex id.
193 See Robel, 389 U.S. at 262.
194 See Dawson, 112 S. Ct at 1096-97. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Healy.
195 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
196 See Dawson, 112 S. CL at 1096-97; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. In Lamella v. New Jersey, the
Supreme Court invalidated a similar 1930s statute directed at gangsters as void for vagueness. 306
U.S. 451, 458 (1939). The Court did not analyze the statute under the First Amendment. See id
197 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
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standard, criminalization of membership in street gangs passes muster
under the First Amendment only if a member knowingly affiliates
himself with an organization with illegal goals, and specifically intends
to further those goals. 198 Recall that the Court will read the latter
requirement into a statute lacking it, if the statute in some way restricts
the quality of membership that is punishable.'`''' But if a statute fails to
distinguish between different levels of membership, then the Court will
not constructively read individualized intent into the statute."6
Section 603 would likely have survived under Healy because it
expressly required intent. Section 603 was not triggered until a crimi-
nal street gang member was convicted of committing a drug or violent.
felony as a member of the gang or on behalf of the gang."' The phrase
"as a member" indicates that simply being a gang member and com-
mitting crimes would not trigger the section; one had to commit the
crime in the capacity of one's membership in the gang."' To read the
section otherwise would render the phrase "as a member" meaning-
less.'" Section 603 thus only applied to gangs that committed crimes
as part of their regular activity and to those members who committed
crimes for the gang. 204
Accordingly, the section would have survived the test laid out in
Healy. 2°5 When an individual commits a crime in the capacity of his
membership in a criminal street gang, it would be difficult to argue
that he has not knowingly affiliated with an organization possessing
illegal aims. Further, because the individual has been convicted of
committing a crime in his capacity as a gang member, it would be
equally difficult to argue that he did not intend to further the illegal
goals of the organization.
Moreover, even if the Court would have been unwilling to read
"as a member" as satisfying the intent requirement laid out in Healy,
the Court could have constructively read that requirement into the
section. 206 The Court will constructively find an intent requirement if
a provision restricts the quality of membership that is criminalized. 207
Section 603 met this standard because it only applied to members of
198 See id.
199 See United States v, Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967).
200 See id.
201 S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1993).
202 See id.
203 See id.
MI See id,
298 Sec supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Healy.
206 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967).
21)7 Id.
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the gang who committed crimes in their capacity as gang members.
That requirement placed a significant limitation on the degree of
membership that is punishable. Casual members of the gang who only
attended social functions would not have been subject to criminal
liability under section 603.208 Only those individuals whose member-
ship rises to the level of committing crimes as members of criminal
street gangs would have been liable:2°9 This limitation is comparable to
the kind of distinction based on quality of membership present in
Scales but lacking in RobelY° Hence, challenges to section 603 would
likely have had to focus on the freedom of intimate association under
the Roberts line of cases. 21 '
B. The Roberts Test
The Supreme Court has suggested that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or the Bill of Rights might protect non-familial organizations
whose characteristics are akin to family units:2 ' 2 Membership in such
protected organizations would be a fundamental right. 2 "When a regu-
lation significantly impairs such a right, the regulation must serve a
substantial interest that cannot be served by less invasive means. 2 "
Courts invalidate regulations that are not so narrowly tailored. 2 "
Since Roberts, the Court has not extended intimate association
protection to a non-familial organization. Instead, the Court has found
organizations too unselective and dissimilar to the traditional family
structure.2 " Nevertheless, the Court has repeatedly applied the test,
suggesting a willingness to extend the protection afforded to families
to a sufficiently "family-like" organization. 217
Although these decisions indicate the Court is reluctant to extend
intimate association status to non-family associations, street gangs ar-
guably offer a compelling case.218 Street gangs are selective, often relatively
small, and exclude others from fundamental areas of the association. 219
208 S. 1607, § 603.
209 See id.
210 See Row 389 U.S. at 262; Scales v, United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961).
2H See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1984).
212 Id. at 620.
213 1d.
214 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
215 Id.
21 ' 3 See, e.g., FVV/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990).
217
 See, e.g., id.
218 See.
219 See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
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These are all factors that the Court found missing in previous claims
for family-based protection. 2" In fact, experts on street gang dynamics
maintain that gangs serve as surrogate families for gang members
whose natural families have failed them. 22 '
The difficulty of becoming a member demonstrates the selective
and exclusive nature of street gangs. 222 The fact that gang members
must survive difficult and painful initiation rituals distinguishes gangs
from service clubs, which, the Court has emphasized, are easy to join."'
For example, unlike in Rotary, where the Court stressed that the clubs
were strongly encouraged to develop their membership lists, most
gangs are very exclusive in admitting members:22'
Moreover, street gang members make it a point to distinguish
themselves from non-members by wearing distinctive clothing. 225 The
value of gang membership is in part measured by constantly reminding
those external to the gang that they are not members. 22" Again, this
dynamic sharply distinguishes street gangs from service clubs, which,
the Court has stressed, are designed to encourage contact with as many
members of the local business community as possible. 227 Gang mem-
bers pride themselves on their separation from non-gang members:228
Thus, street gangs more closely resemble family structures than
any organization that the Court has thus far evaluated under the
Roberts test. Observers of gang dynamics suggest that street gang mem-
bers provide the same kind of support for one another as family
members provide. 2" Although gang members are typically not blood
relatives, the Court has indicated that the absence of blood relation-
ships does not deny an intimate association protection from govern-
ment interference."" In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, the Court re-
fused to extend protection to motel guests, noting that whatever bonds
were created in fewer than ten hours in a motel were not the traditional
family bonds that freedom of intimate association protects." Unlike
220 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619; Board of Directors of Rotary litel v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537,546 (1987).
221 Burrell, supra note 2, at 750-51.
222 see
 Burke, supra note 1, at *6,
223 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619; Burke, supra note 1, at *6.
221 See supra notes 114-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rotary. See supra notes
49-51 and accompanying text for membership rituals.
225 Burke, supra note 1, at *6.
221 ' See id.
227 See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546.
228 1%urke, supra note 1, at *6.
229 Burrell, supra note 2, at 750-51.
25() See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,844-45 (1977).
281 See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,237 (1990).
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the motel guests in FW/PBS, gang members clearly share strong rela-
tionships. 2"2 Although certainly much gang activity could not be char-
acterized as traditional family activity, gangs arguably serve as surrogate
families for members."
But the Court would more likely emphasize the traditional family
values aspect of the Roberts test and deny protection to street gangs.
Although it has applied the analysis in Roberts to non-family organiza-
tions, as noted previously, the Court has demonstrated its reluctance
to expand the doctrine in the manner suggested in Roberts.234 This
reluctance is often couched in value-laden language. In Smith v. Or-
ganization of Foster Families, the Court stressed that the protection of
family relationships stems from the importance of families in nurturing
children.2"5 In FW/PBS, the Court stressed that the right to intimate
association protects the cultivation of shared national ideals and be-
liefs.236
In Roberts, in which the freedom of intimate association was first
recognized as a coherent doctrine, the Court did not stress the impor-
tance of the moral qualities of the organization. 2" 7 Although it began
its analysis by noting that intimate association cases have focused on
relationships critical to national traditions and culture, its initial articu-
lation of the important factors did not include a value component.28
Only in a subsequent paragraph did it add "purpose" to the list of
relevant factors. 2"9 In analyzing the Jaycees' claim, the Court focused
exclusively on issues of size and selectivity, objective factors that obvi-
ated the need for the Court to make a subjective assessment of the
value of the Jaycees. 24°
Section 603 might have invited the Court to go so far as limiting
the doctrine of intimate association to natural and adoptive families
and finally close the door that Roberts cracked open for non-family
organizations. But short of that, it would likely have led the Court to
emphasize the criminal activities of street gangs and thereby clistin-
252 See id.
233 See Burrell, supra note 2, at 750-51.
254 See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary lnt'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546
(1987). In City of Dallas v. Stanglin, the Court even noted that the freedom of association in a
non-family context is primarily a First Amendment, expressive right, suggesting a movement away
from Roberts. 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989).
255 See 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977).
256 See 493 U.S. at 237.
237 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-21.
258 Id. at 620.
255 Id.
24° Id. at 620-621.
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guish them from the hypothetical organization that not only is selective
and exclusive but also develops the "personal bonds [that] have played
a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation's ideals and
beliefs by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs. "241
Although the Roberts Court may have been wary of centering the test
around a value-based assessment of an organization's worth, street
gangs, like hourly motel guests, allow the Court to quickly dismiss any
claim for family-based protection. Thus it is unlikely the Court would
have utilized the doctrine to provide refuge to gangs that engage in a
continuous series of felonious activity.
V. SECTION 521 REVISITED
Because section 603 would very likely have survived scrutiny, the
question turns to the value of section 521's additional requirements.
As noted above, the requirement that individuals intend to further the
gang's felonious activities or enhance their position in the gang makes
explicit what the Supreme Court likely would have read into section
603. To that extent, it makes the statute clearer and does not effectively
alter its application.
However, the new statute's requirement that the prosecution es-
tablish that the gang had a primary purpose of committing felonious
criminal offenses is a different matter. Given the intent requirement,
it is very unlikely this latter requirement would have been necessary
under the expressive association line of cases. The intent to further the
organization's criminal goals renders the association unprotected un-
der Healy v. fames. 242
Moreover, it is equally unlikely that limiting application of the
statute to gangs whose primary purpose is to commit felonies was
required by Roberts. Section 603 already limited application to gangs
whose members had committed a series of felonious crimes over the
previous five years and to members of such gangs who committed
further crimes "as members of the gang." 243 Section 521 retains this
latter requiremen 044 Furthermore, the additional intent requirement
further limits application in that association with the gang can only be
punished when the individual is aware of the gang's criminal activity
and has the requisite intent to further the gang's felonious goals. This
is not the kind of association that has played a "critical role" in the
241 See id. at 618-19.
242 See 408 U.S. 169,186 (1972).
243 See S. 1607, § 603.
244 18 U.S.C.A. § 52I(d) (2) (West Supp. 1995).
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formation of the national culture and ideals, at least not the kind of
ideals upon which this Court would look favorably.245
Thus the primary purpose requirement in section 521 appears to
be unnecessary from a constitutional perspective. Any public policy
justification is equally tenuous. In addition to the primary purpose
requirement, the statute, in another section, limits application to gangs
that engage in a continuing series of felonious activities. 246
This is significant in two ways. First, the statute never defines
"primary purpose." Unless the phrase is interpreted to have no mean-
ing, the additional requirement must mean more than a continuing
series of felonious activity, which is a separate requirement. Otherwise,
the primary purpose requirement, which was added in conference
committee and thus after the continuing series requirement, would be
redundant. It is unlikely courts will read the primary purpose require-
ment in a manner that renders it moot.
Thus prosecutors presumably will have to establish that a gang's
primary purpose is committing felonies by showing something in ad-
dition to a continual series of felonies. That burden will be complicated
by the fact that a gang is not a person, but rather an association of
individuals. Establishing the purpose of an organization—apart from
the individual defendant whose criminal intent must be separately
established—may involve the same problems associated with discern-
ing legislative intent. The primary purpose requirement has the poten-
tial for complicating enforcement of the statute.
Second, it is difficult to identify a strong policy argument for
requiring prosecutors to find evidence of a criminal street gang's
raison d'etre. Association with the intent to further the illegal goals of
gangs that routinely engage in serious criminal activity should be
penalized, regardless of any other legal purposes of the gang. Section
603 did that. The primary purpose requirement places an unnecessary
burden on the prosecution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 603 penalized membership in street gangs. Under tradi-
tional First Amendment freedom of expressive association analysis,
section 603 would have passed muster because it was limited to mem-
bers who were aware of the gang's illegal activities and actively partici-
pated in those illegal activities. And although it can be argued that
245
 See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 215, 237.
296 18 U.S.C.A. 4 521(d) (1).
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street gangs are very similar to families, section 603 would not have
run afoul of the freedom of intimate association because street gangs
do not promote traditional family values.
Section 521 is identical to section 603 with the exception of the
additional intent and primary purpose requirements. The intent re-
quirement clarified section 603 and reflected Congress's awareness of
the expressive association line of cases. The statute specifically requires
the individual to have the intent to further the gang's felonious activi-
ties or maintain or increase his position in the gang. 247 In this regard,
section 521 merely makes express what the Court would have read into
section 603. Adding the intent language was sound drafting.
But the primary purpose requirement is an unnecessary addition
that sets up one more hoop through which the prosecution must jump.
The requirement is not compelled by the Constitution and, from a
policy perspective, is unwise in that it only protects organizations that
engage in a continuing series of felonious activities but have some
other overriding purpose. Despite the "get tough on crime" rhetoric,
at least in this section of the Crime Bill, Congress blinked.
DAVID A. ANDERSON
247 18 U.S.CA. § 521(d)(1)—(2).
